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any existence,' 6 but it is not always clear what is an absolute
nullity.
The acquisitive prescription of thirty years-without good
faith or just title-is based entirely upon continuous possession
for the required time, and is limited to the property which is
"actually possessed by the person pleading it. 1" In Parham v.
Maxwell,18 there was evidence that crops were made and cattle
pastured at irregular intervals on the disputed land, as well
as occasional fence repairs and use of an old road, but the evi-
dence was "of a vague and unconvincing character."'19 While
this decision is based on a simple inadequacy of proof, it reas-
serts the basic principle of a restrictive attitude towards the
acquisitive prescription of thirty years and emphasizes the re-
quirement of conclusiveness of the proof of possession which
must be established by the person pleading this prescription.
PROPERTY
Jan P. Charmatz*
Only one case of outstanding importance in this field was
decided by the Supreme Court during the past term. In Humble
Oil & Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board' a controversy over the
ownership of the bed of a navigable lake, the same problem
which had given rise to the much discussed decisions in State V.
Erwin2 and Miami Corporation v. State3 was again presented to
the court, only this time in a different context.4 The facts of the
case and a detailed analysis of the decision will be found else-
where in this issue.5 The result of the decision is, just as in State
v. Erwin, recognition of private ownership of beds of navigable
lakes. In neither case was there any dispute about the fact that
the lakes in question, Duck Lake and Calcasieu Lake, were navig-
able at the time of the decision and in 1812 when Louisiana was
16. 1 Planiol, Traitd 2lmentaire de Droit Civil, no 2662 (12 ed. 1937).
17. Art. 3503, La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. 222 La. 149, 62 So. 2d 255 (1952).
19. 222 La. 149, 155, 62 So. 2d 255, 257.
* Visiting Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State Uni-
versity; Faculty Editor, LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839 (1953).
2. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
3. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
4. See infra note 10.
5. See Note, infra p. 267.
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admitted to the Union.6 There never has been any doubt about
the basic proposition that the beds of navigable waters are "pub-
lic things ... the property of which is vested in a whole nation"
under the principles of our Civil Code and the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court, and therefore not susceptible of private
ownership.1 Nevertheless, in the Erwin case the court had found
it possible to obviate the application of this simple rule by basing
its decision on the non-applicability of Articles 509 and 510 of the
Civil Code and on the assumption that the beds of fresh water
navigable lakes mean "their bottoms, as they existed, at the
time the state was admitted to the Union."' 8 The result was, as
is well known; to recognize parts of the bed of Calcasieu Lake,
as it then existed, as susceptible of private ownership.9 In the
instant case the court achieved the same result by holding that
the state was barred forever, under Act 62 of 1912, from attack-
ing the title of the Humble Oil & Refining Company and its
predecessor.'0
In both the Erwin and the Humble cases we may have diffi-
culty in seeing an economic reason for adjudicating the pro-
ceeds of oil wells to the state and not to the private individuals
or companies which were instrumental in discovering and devel-
oping them. But there is more involved in this case than the
decision of the question who is to receive the oil royalties which
6. See 173 La. 507, 509, 138 So. 84, 85 (1931), and 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839,
840 (La. 1953). In the second case a stipulation existed between the parties
to that effect.
7. Art. 453, La. Civil Code of 1870. Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La.
784, 812, 173 So. 315, 324 (1936). See also 186 La. 784, 806, 815, 173 So. 315, 322,
325. For an analysis of the jurisprudence see Comment, Alluvion and Derelic-
tion in Lakes, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 438, 441 (1933), Comment, The Public and
the Private Domains of the State, 12 Tulane L. Rev. 428 (1938), Comment,
Navigability as Applied to Lakes in Louisiana, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 698
(1946), Comment, Ownership of the Beds of Navigable Lakes, 21 Tulane L.
Rev. 454 (1947).
8. 173 La. 507, 515, 138 So. 84, 87 (1931). In order to avoid quoting these
words out of their context, the full text of this passage is repeated here: "So
far as relates to fresh water navigable lakes, with which we are presently
alone concerned, there can be no question that their bottoms belong to the
state, up to the high water mark, by virtue of its sovereignty. But this means
their bottoms, as they existed, at the time the state was admitted into the
Union, and does not include that part of such bottoms, later formed by action
of the waters in washing away the soil of lands, privately owned, and thereby
submerging them. The submerged lands still belong to the owners."
9. Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 812, 173 So. 315, 324 (1936).
See also Comment, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 438, 441 (1933).
10. The court stated: "We do not deem it essential to consider the merits
of the title claims of either the State or Salt Domes because it is perfectly
apparent, from the foregoing statement of the case, that whatever right the
State may have had to contest the title of Salt Domes has long since been
barred by the peremption of six years provided by Act No. 62 of 1912." 223 La.
47, 64 So. 2d 839, 840 (1953).
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were the object of the concursus proceeding instituted by the
Humble Oil & Refining Company. It may well be pointed out
that nearly a hundred years ago Justice Buchanan in a concur-
ring opinion, after severely criticizing an article of our Civil
Code11 which he considered as proof "that the right of private
property is less sacred in this country than it is in the monarchical
States of Europe," nevertheless applied this article for the simple
reason: "Ita scripta est lex.'1 2
Even if the court should feel reluctant to decide situations
as those presented in the Erwin and Humble cases in what
might be considered a "fundamentalist" fashion by simply apply-
ing the rules of our Civil Code concerning the susceptibility of
things of ownership, it is submitted that the result of the Humble
case could have been avoided by a careful interpretation of the
language of Act 62 of 1912 under which the case was decided.
The applicable section of this act reads as follows:
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana, etc., That all suits or proceedings of the State of
Louisiana, private corporations, partnerships or persons to
vacate and annul any patent issued by the State of Louisiana,
duly signed by the Governor of the State and the Register
of the State Land Office, and of record in the State Land
Office, or any transfer of property by any subdivision of the
State, shall be brought only within six years of the issuance
of patent, provided, that suits to annul patents previously
issued shall be brought within six years from the passage
of this Act."13
Even under the rules of statutory 'construction of common
law states, words used in special statutes must be construed
within the frame of reference of the general statutes, and it is
assumed that the intent of the Legislature is "to establish a more
uniform and logical system of law."'14 There can be little doubt
that in Louisiana the general frame of reference for interpreting
the language of this act is provided by the Civil Code and that
the basic concepts of our property law apply unless a contrary
legislative intent is proved.1 5 The words "transfer of property"
11. Art. 672, La. Civil Code of 1825, now Art. 676, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Jeannin v. DeBlanc, 11 La. Ann. 465, 467 (1856).
13. La. Act 62 of 1912, § 1. See now La. R.S. 1950, 9:5661.
14. 3 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 159 (3rd ed.,
Horack, 1943). See also Crawford, The Construction of Statutes 280 (1940).
15. See Art. 17, La. Civil Code of 1870, and particularly Melancon v.
Mizell, 216 La. 711, 727, 44 So. 2d 826, 831 (1950).
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as used in the context of Act 62 of 1912 therefore can hardly
mean anything but "transfer of things susceptible of owner-
ship."11 As in many other cases, the court did not really try to
interpret the statute or the articles of the Civil Code, preferring
to rest its decision on "an unbroken line of jurisprudence"'1 and
disposing rather summarily of the contention of counsel for the
state that this jurisprudence is inapplicable. The argument of
the court disposing of the state's contention is subject to the same
objection which applies to the entire decision. It assumes that
beds of navigable lakes can be the object of a "transfer of prop-
erty." Particularly in view of several recent decisions of our
Supreme Court showing an increasing emphasis on our civilian
tradition and deep respect for the principles of our Civil Code it
is hard to believe that the Humble case will remain its last word
on the problems presented therein.18
The position taken in the Erwin case was rectified by the
Supreme Court within five years in the Miami Corporation case
by declaring it erroneous and overruled in spite of the vigorous
dissent of Chief Justice O'Niell. The deep sense of judicial respon-
sibility shown by Chief Justice Fournet in recognizing past mis-
takes in his opinion in Speed v. Page:" and the above mentioned
16. Compare the interpretation of Section 11 of La. Act 97 of 1890 in
State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 108, 83 So. 421, 425 (1919).
17. State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927);
Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942);
O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1945). It must be
noted that the Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. case involved a lake which "has
never been navigable either in fact or as the word is defined by law." (164 La.
240, 246, 113 So. 833, 835 [1927].) The Realty Operators case assumed "for
the sake of argument only, that the lake was navigable in fact in 1812." (202
La. 398, 413, 12 So. 2d 198, 203 [1942].) The sole case in point, the O'Brien
decision, loses a great deal of its value as authority by the fact that six
judges noted that they concurred. (209 La. 266, 278, 24 So. 2d 470, 473 [1946].)
For an analysis of the applicability of this jurisprudence, see also Note infra
p. 267, 271.
18. See, e.g., the language used by Justice Moise in a recent decision,
Succession of Gladney, 67 So. 2d 547, 548 (La. 1953): "Our Civil Code is the
legal monarch over all things it surveys. It is both subject and object,
creator and created, preserver and preserved. In fact, it is legally Louisiana's
Ark of the Covenant. However, for the better preservation of the law, we
must put an end to the idolatry of precedent worship of decisions that are
not in accord with the views and aspirations of the present and refuse to
adopt the legal abstractions of other jurisdictions. We should more closely
safeguard our own codal articles as to the devolution of property, in order
to prevent our being drawn into the vortex of federal governmental regula-
tions. There should be less focusing on the words of judges, and we should
become imbued with the spirit of 'what Is right is right'."
19. In this case the Chief Justice wrote: "It would appear that much of
this confusion and lack of harmony stems from pronouncements of this
Court, made without citations of authority, without due consideration of the
object and purpose of the Act, and in total disregard of the admonition of
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awareness of the entire court of our civilian tradition strengthen
this writer's hope that Louisiana judicial history will repeat itself
and that the Humble decision will share the fate of the Erwin
case.
None of the other decisions in the field of property law are
likely to create much controversy. In Bishop v. Copeland2 ° the
court reiterated one of' the basic rules of our property law,
namely, that the law of registry of title to immovable property,
Articles 2251-2266, "is not applicable when the ownership of, or
claim affecting, the immovable has been vested in the claimant
by mere operation of law."21 In the same case an interesting
question concerning the rights of a good faith possessor to be
reimbursed for the expenses incurred improving the property
under Article 3453 was decided. The defendant in a petitory
action for a piece of real estate had to give up three-fourths of
it to the co-heirs of his author in title.22 Having unsuccessfully
pleaded estoppel against the claim of the co-heirs who had
brought suit against him, he claimed the right to retain the thing
until he was reimbursed the expenses which he had incurred in
it. The court found that the general principle of Article 3453
"does not mean that [the good faith possessor] must recover in the
petitory action brought against him for the purpose of establish-
ing joint ownership of the land, particularly when the possessor
is not wholly evicted and is recognized as owner in indivision,
like in this case. '23
TAX TITLES
The importance of tax titles in the property law of Louisiana
is not only documented by the inclusion in the Constitution of a
special section dealing with them but also by the number of
cases which come up for decision by the Supreme Court.
24
the lawmakers that its provisions should be liberally construed in favor of
the employee. We think, therefore, that a reexamination of the subject is
required." Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 537, 62 So. 2d 824, 827 (1952).
20. 222 La. 284, 62 So. 2d 486 (1952).
21. 222 La. 284, 292, 62 So. 2d 486, 488.
22. See Long v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937); Dugas v. Powell,
207 La. 316, 21 So. 2d 366 (1945). The other aspects of this case are discussed
infra p. 152, in the part of the symposium dealing with Successions.
23. 222 La. 284, 300, 62 So. 2d 486, 491 (1952). This, of course, does not
preclude the defendant's right to bring an independent action for compensa-
tion which will have to overcome the difficulty of proving the amount to
which he may be entitled. Ibid.
24. See, e.g., The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949
Term-Taxation, 10 LoUISIANA LAW REviEw 148 (1950).
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Although the broad language used in Section 11 of Article X of
the 1921 Constitution "announces the public policy of this State
to set at rest tax titles once and for all, ' 25 the reports are full of
decisions involving attacks against tax titles in one form or
another.
In Kaufman v. Jackson,2 6 a proceeding to confirm and quiet
tax title, the claim of defendants that they and the deceased
original tax debtor had continued in "actual, corporeal possession
of the property" gave rise to a discussion of the nature of the
possession of a piece of land, owned in undivided parts. In the
instant case the controversy involved title to an undivided one-
third interest in a certain property which had been acquired by
the plaintiff's author in title in a tax sale duly recorded in 1931.
The entire property consisted of 81 acres, of which 27 acres, or
exactly one-third of the property, located next to the plaintiff's
farm, was divided from the rest by a small creek. Over this part
he had exercised full control but had done little to exercise pos-
session as co-owner over the remaining 54 acres. Whereas the
court of appeal centered its attention on plaintiff's possession 27
the Supreme Court correctly emphasized that in a case involving
the validity of a tax title it is not the purchaser's possession (in
this case the plaintiff's) which must be scrutinized but that "the
possession to be considered in cases of this kind is the one that
is retained or exercised by the tax debtor after the tax sale of
his property. 2 8 What is important is whether there existed a
debtor's "claim operating as a continuing protest against the
tax title. '2 Only the defendants' exclusive control and dominion
over the whole property could have defeated a tax title recorded
more than five years previously. In the instant case defendants
had openly acknowledged the tax sale purchaser's rights and
never protested against his assertions of possession. Therefore
the Supreme Court held that they had failed to prove a claim
which might have justified an exception from the general rule
of Section 11, Article X, of the 1921 Constitution, reversed the
25. King v. Moresi, 223 La. 54, 64 So. 2d 841, 842 (1953).
26. 221 La. 957, 60 So. 2d 886 (1952).
27. The court of appeal had stated in its opinion: "There is not the least
question about the fact that [plaintiff] Kaufman never exercised the least
possession insofar as the 54 acres was concerned." 55 So. 2d 39, 41 (La.
App. 1951).
28. 221 La. 957, 966, 60 So. 2d 886, 889 (1952).
29. 221 La. 957, 966, 60 So. 2d 886, 888, citing Board of Commissioners v.
Sperling, 205 La. 494, 500, 17 So. 2d 720, 722 (1944), which decision, in turn,
relies on Levenberg v. Shanks, 165 La. 419, 422, 115 So. 641, 642 (1928), which
cites a whole line of previous cases.
[VOL. XIV
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judgment of the court of appeal and ordered the judgment of the
district court for plaintiff affirmed.30
In King v. Moresi l another aspect of the validity of tax
titles came before the court. Plaintiff had brought suit to have
declared null and void a tax sale which had taken place and had
been duly recorded more than five years before. The contention
was that the tax sale was void ab initio since the property had
been acquired in violation of Act 94 of 1902, now R.S. 47:2194, 32
by the sheriff in his wife's name and therefore not susceptible of
peremption. Although the language of this statute declares direct
or indirect purchase by the sheriff as "null and void," the court,
citing Close v. Rowan,33 recognized the plea of peremption and
upheld the tax title, distinguishing the situation in the instant
case from judicial sales "made in violation of a prohibitory law. '34
In a dissenting opinion Justice Moise pointed out that both in the
instant case and in Close v. Rowan, its main authority, the
Supreme Court had "overlooked the first ruling" on this prob-
lem, namely Pitre v. Haas.35 He forcefully argued on the basis of
Articles 12 and 1892 of the Civil Code that the rule in Pitre v.
Haas excluding a tax sale in violation of Act 94 of 1902 from the
constitutional peremption should have been applied. It may be
well to note, however, that in that case four Justices concurred
in the decree only and that the facts were essentially different
from those of the instant case. Both for this reason and in view
of the policy expressed in our Constitution "to set at rest tax
titles once and for all"36 the majority opinion appears to be sound.
SERVITUDES
The doubts which may exist in many a Louisiana lawyer's
mind whether the subject matter of Articles 667-669 of our Civil
30. The court stated: "It was necessary for [the defendants] to have the
exclusive control and dominion over the whole property in order to defeat
the tax title which the plaintiff had acquired and which had been recorded
more than five years previously." Kaufman v. Jackson, 221 La. 957, 967,
60 So. 2d 886, 889 (1952).
31. 223 La. 54, 64 So. 2d 841, 842 (1953).
32. The full text of La. R.S. 1950, 47:2194, reads: "It is unlawful for any
sheriff, tax collector or their deputies or any other officer, state, municipal or
parochial, whose duties are to assess or collect taxes of any nature what-
soever for the state, parish or municipality, to buy either directly or indi-
rectly, any property, movable or immovable, sold or offered for sale, for
taxes; any sale of such property to such an officer shall be null and void."
33. 171 La. 263, 130 So. 350 (1930).
34. 223 La. 54, 64 So. 2d 841, 842 (1953).
35. 110 La. 163, 179, 34 So. 361, 367 (1903).
36. 223 La. 54, 64 So. 2d 841, 842 (1953).
.1953]
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Code should be treated under the aspect of "Servitudes Imposed
by Law" as indicated by the chapter heading of the code or
under the tort aspect37 will most probably remain unchanged in
spite of the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the articles of
the code in Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes38 Although a
statement like
"While the common-law authorities [on nuisance] relied
upon and cited by plaintiffs may be persuasive, they are not
decisive of the issue in view of our codal articles [667-669]
and jurisprudence."39
will certainly be appreciated by all those who cherish the code,
the fact remains that the common law nuisance doctrine is deeply
imbedded in our jurisprudence .4  In this respect the situation in
this state is little different from other civil law jurisdictions
which became exposed to common law influences like Puerto
Rico and the Philippines."'
In Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes plaintiffs-respondents,
property owners in the immediate vicinity of a proposed funeral
home, prayed for and obtained a preliminary injunction against
its establishment, claiming that it would constitute a nuisance
in a strictly residential neighborhood. 42 The defendant, having
37. See Stone, The Loesch Case and Article 667, 17 Tulane L. Rev. 596
(1943); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-
Property, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 234, 236; Torts, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
248 (1948); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950
Term-Property, 11 LOUISIANA LAW RFVIEW 178, 179; Torts, 11 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEW 186, 188 (1951).
38. 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100 (1952).
39. 222 La. 57, 89, 62 So. 2d 100, 111 (1952).
40. The two decisions relied upon In the instant case, Borgnemouth
Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corporation, 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488 (1947) and
Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 3 So. 2d 281 (1941), accepted the common law
nuisance doctrine.
41. When the Philippines gained their full independence after nearly a
half-century of American sovereignty and decided on a revision of the Span-
ish Civil Code of 1889, the Code Commission formally stated: "One of the
most serious hindrances to the enjoyment of life and property is a nuisance,
whether public or private. Provisions for its abatement, both judicial and
extra-judicial, are therefore indispensable in a well rounded Civil Code," and
Included in their new Civil Code of 1950 a new chapter on "Nuisance" after
the chapter on "Easements and Servitudes." The substance of the articles
of this chapter was taken from the Civil Code of California. 2 Garcia & Alba,
Civil Code of the Philippines 930 (1951). The Spanish Civil Code of 1889, like
the Napoleonic Code, contained no articles equivalent to Articles 667-669,
La. Civil Code of 1870.
On the common law influence in Puerto Rico generally, see Dainow, The
Method of Legal Development Through Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana
and Puerto Rico, 22 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 108
(1953).
42. 222 La. 57, 61, 62 So. 2d 100, 101 (1952).
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been granted devolutive but not suspensive appeal, applied for
writs to the Supreme Court, which ordered issuance of a writ
of certiorari with a stay order and an order to respondents to
show cause why the relief sought in relator's application should
not be granted. In its first opinion the court recalled the writs
issued in the case and remanded it to the district court, finding
that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying to
the defendant-relator a suspensive appeal. As to the merits of
the case, the court carefully distinguished between a nuisance
per se and a nuisance per accidens or in fact, quoting from
Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corporation43 and stated
that "[t]he greater weight of modern authority is to the effect
that the establishment and operation of a funeral home is suffi-
ciently objectionable to make it a nuisance in fact."'4 4 It found
that of twenty-two states whose courts had passed on the ques-
tion whether the establishment and operation of a funeral home
should be enjoined in a strictly residential neighborhood, nine-
teen followed the majority rule and only three took the view
that a funeral home in such a district does not become a nuisance
per accidens by the fact of its being located there. After quoting
extensively from decisions of other jurisdictions"5 and pointing
out that in a semi-commercial area or in one in transition from
residential to commercial area an injunction will not issue, the
opinion stated: "The principle underlying the majority rule is
found in Article 667 of our LSA-Civil Code." Justices McCaleb
and LeBlanc dissented in separate opinions, both pointing out
that under the Moss v. Burke & Trotti case,46 physical annoyance
is necessary to warrant an injunction and that on the basis of
Articles 667 and 668 inconvenience alone is not enough.4 7
Because of its concern "whether or not the provisions of
Articles 667, 668 and 669 of the LSA-Civil Code were properly
interpreted in the majority opinion," the court granted a rehear-
ing and set aside the injunction. In the new opinion the court
43. 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488 (1947).
44. 222 La. 57, 63, 62 So. 2d 100, 102 (1952).
45. The court discussed Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429 (1925);
Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 N.W. 507 (1917); Williams v. Montgomery,
184 Miss. 547, 186 So. 302 (1939); Streett v. Marshall; 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494
(1927); Blackburn v. Bishop, 299 S.W. 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), and cited
dozens of decisions from other jurisdictions following the majority rule, 222
La. 57, 64, 62 So. 2d 100, 105 (1952).
46. 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281, 285 (1941).
47. Both Justices stress the text of Articles 667-669. 222 La. 57, 78, 62
So. 2d 100, 107 (1952).
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concluded, after again reviewing the two recent decisions in the
Borgnemouth and Moss cases:
"From a careful reading of the aforementioned articles of
the LSA-Civil Code [667 and 668], it is apparent that, unless
the establishment and operation of the funeral home is pro-
hibited by rules of police or custom of the place, it cannot
be enjoined prior to its operation and then only if it is oper-
ated in such a manner as to cause damage to those living in
the neighboring houses. ' '48
Justice Hawthorne, the writer of the first opinion, dissented,
emphasizing that he could not believe "that the average person
in this jurisdiction is any less sensitive to the depressing effects
of a funeral home than is the average person in the common-law
jurisdictions" and that "a comparative evaluation of the conflict-
ing interests in this case" would justify an injunction if it can
be shown that the area is exclusively residential. It would seem,
however, that the majority opinion rendered upon rehearing is
more in accord with the text of the article. The court's statement
that common law authorities may be persuasive but not decisive
"in view of our codal articles and jurisprudence" 49 will be appre-
ciated by all civilians.
EMINENT DOMAIN
During the last term more cases were decided dealing with
expropriation questions than with any other problem in the field
of property law.5" Just as in the past the issues decided by the
Supreme Court did not concern the right to expropriate, 1 but
the value of the expropriated property.5 2 In all the cases the
court could do little more than either find that the trial judge
had correctly ascertained the "fair and reasonable value" and
48. 222 La. 57, 87, 62 So. 2d 100, 110 (1952).
49. 222 La. 57, 89, 62 So. 2d 100, 111.
50. See Statistical Survey, Table IV, supra pp. 69 and 70.
51. Only in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Cowley, 223 La. 672, 66 So. 2d
588 (1953), decided on the question whether there was a right to suspensive
appeal, the constitutionality of La. R.S. 1950, 45:254 was contested.
52. Compare also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1949-1950 Term-Property, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 180 (1951).
The evaluation of expropriated land as the basis of the jurisdictional
amount for appeal to the Supreme Court was involved in Maxfield v. Gulf
States Utilities Co., 222 La. 987, 64 So. 2d 243 (1953). Procedural aspects of
eminent domain cases were decided in Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v.
Wyatt Lumber Co., 221 La. 886, 60 So. 2d 713 (1952) and Interstate Oil Pipe
Line Co. v. Cowley, 223 La. 672, 66 So. 2d 588 (1953), which refers to the first
mentioned case.
[VOL. =I
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that the award represented "just and adequate compensation, ' 53
or amend the evaluation of the trial judge and ascertain the
compensation from the often rather meager evidence contained
in the record of the case. The latter happened in American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. East End Realty Co.5 4 In spite of the paucity of evi-
dence in the trial record the court did not hesitate to apply
unquestionably sound judgment in assessing the value of a servi-
tude for the purpose of laying a cable along a public highway.
Chief Justice Fournet refused to recognize as authority decisions
of other states "controlled by their statutory law or by rules of
real property tenure foreign to our legal system."55 The same
independence and directness of approach of the Chief Justice
was also evidenced in his opinion in Patin v. New, Orleans.e
In this. case the question arose whether the city was respon-
sible for damage resulting from diversion of traffic. Plaintiffs
alleged their property had suffered injury as a result of the
construction of an overpass. The trial judge found on the basis
of considerable evidence that the property, formerly operated
and leased as an oil station and automobile repair shop, had suf-
fered a total diminution in value of $10,000 of which three-fourths
was due to the diversion of traffic for which no liability existed,
since it was effected in exercise of the city's police power. He
therefore awarded plaintiffs only $2,500. Since plaintiffs-appellees
had cited Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Commission17 as hold-
ing, that contrary to the general rule, diminution in value due to
diversion of traffic is compensable damage, 58 this decision was
carefully analyzed by the Chief Justice in his opinion. He found
that in that case the award had been made not for mere diversion
of traffic but for "interference with ingress to and egress from
properties, as well as obstruction of light and air and the impair-
ment of view,"5 circumstances which are not present in the
instant case. The judgment of the district court therefore was
affirmed. To have decided this case differently would have im-
53. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2.
54. 223 La. 532, 66 So. 2d 327 (1953).
55. 66 So, 2d 327, 328.
56. 223 La. 703, 66 So. 2d 616, 617 (1953). In this case the Chief Justice
preferred to base his opinion on one single Louisiana decision-Harrison v.
Louisiana Highway Commission, 202 La. 345, 11 So. 2d 612 (1942)-discarding
"other authorities ... as they are not apposite from either a factual or legal
standpoint."
57. 202 La. 345, 11 So. 2d 612 (1942).
58. 223 La. 703, 66 So. 2d 616, 617 (1953). For the treatment of this prob-
lem in common law jurisdictions, see Jahr, Law of Eminent Domain-
Valuation and Procedure, §§ 47-56 (1953).
59. 223 La. 703, 66 So. 2d 616, 617 (1953).
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posed serious financial burdens on any future traffic improvement
projects.
As on previous occasions the Supreme Court refused to take
into consideration "mere possibilities" in fixing the market value
of expropriated land. 0 In Plaquemines Parish School Board v.
Miller,1 a case in which the issue was a "matter solely of the
value of the lands" it was stated again that "it will not do for
the owner to say that at some indefinite time it is foreseeable
that his property, because it adjoins a growing town, will have an
added value as a subdivision project. '62
SALES
J. Denson Smith*
The cases falling under this heading that were decided by
the court during the last term included a few of more than
passing jurisprudential interest. High on this list was a group
of fifteen suits consolidated for trial, Breaux v. Laird.' The
court reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining an
exception of no right or cause of action and held that the pur-
chaser of a defective home from a subdivision developer was
entitled to sue the surety on the contractor's bond. The decision
was bottomed on Article 2011 of the Civil Code. This article
provides for the transmission of rights resulting from a contract
relative to immovable property in favor of the transferee of
the property. No exactly similar application of this article has
60. See Louisiana Highway Commission v. Guidry, 176 La, 389, 403, 146
So. 1, 5 (1933); Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433
(1910).
61. 222 La. 584, 63 So. 2d 6 (1953).
62. 222 La. 584, 589, 63 So. 2d 6, 8 (1953). See also Louisiana Highway
Commission v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933). The instant case shows
just as the American Tel. & Tel. Co. case a paucity of evidence relating to
the value of land, as pointed out by Justice LeBlanc. In Texas Pipe Line Co.
v. Johnson, 223 La. 380, 65 So. 2d 884, 886 (1953), Justice Hamiter correctly
refused a motion by defendant-appellant to remand the cause for the recep-
tion of additional evidence, and cited language from Kinnebrew v. Louisiana
Ice Co., 216 La. 472, 501, 43 So. 2d 798, 808 (1949), that our Supreme Court is
"not disposed to permit litigants to try their cases piecemeal and continue
protracted litigation as to facts that could have been established on the
original trial," just as he had done once before in Young v. Mulroy, 216 La.
961, 971, 45 So. 2d 357, 360 (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 223 La. 446-465, 65 So. 2d 907-913 (1953).
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